Recovery of a theory Ì is needed if it does not have a model under the given semantics Sem, i.e. if the theory is Sem-inconsistent. In general, to recover an inconsistent theory Ì, a transformation Ê is applied to Ì and Ì is replaced by a consistent theory Ê´Ìµ. If a classical semantics is used, it is clear that Ê should be a contraction. For nonmonotonic theories, e.g. nonmonotonic databases, however, in general it is unclear how to restore the consistency of such a theory: indeed, several options for recovery that use (mixtures of) contractions and expansions have been proposed in the literature. In this paper, we propose a more fundamental approach to study the recovery problem by stating some minimal set of rationality postulates for recovery. In these postulates we assume that, when recovering a theory Ì with respect to some intended semantics, one can fall back on a weaker, so called back-up semantics for Ì. Based on these rationality postulates our general conclusion is that for cumulative theories, expansions are not suitable, while for non-cumulative theories like default logic, auto-epistemic logic and nonmonotonic logic programming, contractions cannot be used as recovery operators.
Introduction
Theory recovery is the process of changing an inconsistent theory Ì in such a way that it becomes consistent. Here, a theory is just an arbitrary, not necessarily closed, set of sentences. The dominant approach to recovery of classical theories is the well-known AGM ( [4] ) framework for theory revision where the recovery of an inconsistent theory Ì consists in replacing Ì by a contraction Ì ¼ of Ì , i.e. Ì ¼ is a consistent theory obtained from Ì by removing some part of Ì . Regardless of the choice for the exact part of the theory to be removed, there is no discussion about the type of recovery operator to be applied here: whenever a classical theory is inconsistent, contraction is a natural type of recovery operator to use in restoring consistency. This connection, however, is not so obvious if we have to restore consistency in non-classical theories such as nonmonotonic theories. Here, it is not clear at all which type of recovery operator would be most suitable: while contractions might be applied to restore consistency, sometimes it happens that an expansion can be applied as well, and in still other cases a recovery process might be applied in which some statements are added while others are deleted.
It comes as no surprise that in the literature different proposals for recovery of nonmonotonic theories have been offered. In [12] , contractions are proposed in recovering nonmonotonic theories. In [8] , the authors propose to recover a theory by means of a minimal set of both additions and removals, while others like [1, 14, 16, 18] use expansions to restore consistency in (nonmonotonically) inconsistent theories. Many of these approaches, however, seem to work well for only a particular formalism and for some ad hoc reasons. Clearly, what the field lacks is a formulation of the ideas underlying the recovery process in a clear and unifying way.
It is therefore the purpose of this paper to state a set of intuitive and general rationality postulates every recovery process has to satisfy at the least. Essentially, these postulates aim to describe which properties a suitable recovery operator should minimally have, independently from the specific properties of the intended logic used. We remark, however, that it is not our intention to fully characterize this recovery process. These rationality postulates are primarily used to establish a relation between the type of recovery operator used (i.e. a contraction, an expansion or perhaps a mix of them) and the particular abstract properties of the (intended) logic used, such as monotonicity, cumulativity, etc.
We motivate and introduce these postulates for recovery in Section 2, after we have identified some crucial properties of consequence operators associated with the range of logics we want to investigate. Then, in Section 3, using those properties, we state some results pertaining to the type of the recovery operation that should be applied in order to satisfy the rationality postulates. Our general conclusion is that there is a rather sharp division between logics satisfying (weak) cumulativity and those that do not. This means that, contrary to what one might expect on the basis of recovery of classical theories, theory contraction is not suitable for recovery of nonmonotonic theories as default logic, auto-epistemic logic and nonmonotonic logic programming. On the other hand, expansion is not suitable whenever we are dealing with logics satisfying (weak) cumulativity, like classical logic, preferential logics be applied successfully in the recovery of logic programs using the stable model semantics.
of the theory Ì ¼ Ì with the additional constraint that should be implied by the recovered theory. Therefore, recovery is more general than revision: we do not make any assumption w.r.t. the cause of the inconsistency and w.r.t. the information that has to be retained or not.
A framework for theory recovery
We want to deal with theory recovery where the logic used might be classical or nonclassical. In all cases, using a logic with semantics Ë Ñ to reason about a theory Ì boils down to selecting a subset of intended models (Ë Ñ-models) from some background collection of models for Ì . In the classical case it is tempting to identify the class of intended models with the class of background models 1 , while in the nonmonotonic case the set of intended models usually is a strict subset of the class of all (background) models of Ì . We say that Ì is Ë Ñ-inconsistent and needs to be recovered if the set of intended models of Ì determined by Ë Ñ is empty. We might say that the intended models of a theory Ì under a semantics Ë Ñ represent those states of affairs we are willing to consider as acceptable or normal, while the remaining set of background models characterizes more or less abnormal states of affairs. These intended models are useful for making predictions about the world if it is as normal as we suppose it is. For example, the idea about nonmonotonic theories is that they allow one to use common sense reasoning patterns to infer facts that normally can be expected, given a state of affairs represented by the theory. In this view an inconsistent theory Ì , characterized by the absence of intended models, signals an abnormal state of affairs that we want to resolve. Confronted with such a difficulty, in principle we could choose between two possible ways to overcome them:
change the underlying reasoning mechanism
The original (intended) semantics is considered as defective and has to be replaced by a more sophisticated semantics that is also able to handle such (slight) abnormalities.
change the theory
Instead of considering these properties as defects of a semantics, one could also reason that such consequences have to be expected if the world apparently is not as normal as expected and therefore, instead of changing our semantics, we have to change our ideas about what actually is the case. Adapting to such slight abnormalities should be sufficient to make our intended reasoning applicable again.
In this paper we choose the second alternative: we do not blame our semantics for failing to provide the right models, since this semantics was intended to be used in 1 But note that a paraconsistent semantics can also be used as a background semantics normal states of affairs. Instead, if we are in such a situation in which the intended set of models for Ì is empty, whereas the set of background models is not, we consider the latter set as an approximation of the set of intended models. For, since it allows for more abnormalities to occur and is successful (i.e, does yield models), it may give us clues about which abnormalities we have to be prepared for. This information then, can be used to change the original theory Ì to a recovered theory Ì ¼ . Since the abnormalities have now been accounted for in Ì ¼ , it seems natural to apply our original intended semantics to Ì ¼ to derive our standard expectations modulo the abnormalities we discovered. This explains why we adhere to the principle change the theory and not the logic to reason with.
It is clear that in the picture above, two semantics for a theory Ì play a part: an intended semantics Ë Ñ ÒØ providing the collection of intended models of Ì and a backup semantics Ë Ñ providing a collection of background models to choose from. So we assume that Ë Ñ ÒØ´Ì µ Ë Ñ ´Ìµ. If, for a given theory Ì it turns out that Ì is Ë Ñ-inconsistent, i.e. Ë Ñ ÒØ´Ì µ , while Ë Ñ ´Ìµ , we want to recover Ì , replacing it by a transformed theory Ì ¼ Ê´Ì µ such that Ì ¼ is Ë Ñ-consistent.
Of course, not every transformation of Ì is acceptable; we will use some notion of minimal change to choose between different alternatives. But how to measure the difference between Ì and Ì ¼ ? That is exactly where we have our backup semantics for: we should choose the recovery operator Ê in such a way that Ì and Ê´Ì µ differ as little as possible w.r.t. the backup semantics. Taking this very global idea about recovery as our point of departure, we would like to study its consequences for the type of recovery (e.g. contraction or expansion) to apply.
Before we formally introduce the framework and translate these ideas in some rationality postulates, we give two examples, showing how this framework might be applied to both monotonic and nonmonotonic theory recovery.
Example 2.1
We will show that the standard AGM-approach to classical theory revision fits well to our approach. Suppose that we have a classical inconsistent theory Ì and apply for example a full meet contraction Ê Ñ to Ì to change it into a consistent theory Ì ¼ . In this case our intended semantics is classical, while as our backup semantics we might take a semantics that given a theory Ì returns the set of all models of maximal consistent subsets of Ì . Clearly, for every theory Ì , the set of intended (= classical) models is contained in the set of backup models. Also note that in this case Ì and the full-meet contraction Ê Ñ´Ì µ are equal under the backup semantics.
Example 2.2
We will show that using a nonmonotonic intended semantics also expansions might be used to recover a theory. As an example we take Reiter's Default Logic (DL) and use an entailment relation 2 based on the intersection of all Reiter extensions as our intended semantics and an entailment relation based on the intersection of all minimal extensions as our backup semantics. More precisely, given a theory Ï and a fixed set of defaults , the intended meaning of Ï is based on the intersection of all Reiter extensions of the default theory´Ï µ and the backup semantics is based on the intersection of all minimal extensions of´Ï µ.
Suppose that we have the following set of defaults:
If you push the button for the 13th floor ( ) and you can assume the system not to be faulty ( Ü), then the cage moves up to the 13th floor ( Hence, by changing the theory to adapt to the apparent abnormalities, we are able to apply our intended semantics again. This example answers a possible question about using the backup semantics instead of the intended semantics if the latter causes an inconsistency: in most cases, we would like to obtain stronger conclusions than is possible when keeping the backup semantics.
Summarizing, the backup semantics only serves to indicate the abnormalities that we have to account for. This information is used to translate the original theory Ì into a theory Ì ¼ such that Ì ¼ has intended models. The backup semantics serves as a first approximation for the recovered set of intended models of the theory Ì and will be used to select the intended models from.
Before we give a more formal account of these intuitive ideas, we first present some terminological and notational conventions. Hereafter, we present some properties of consequence operators to characterize different logics we want to investigate and then we give a set of rationality postulates for theory recovery. After that we are ready to investigate the relationships between on the one hand the logical properties of backup semantics and the intended semantics and on the other hand the type of recovery operator to use.
Preliminaries
Given a language Ä, a theory Ì is any, not necessarily closed, subset of Ä. We use to denote variables over theories. We assume to have a way to assign to each Ì some (possibly empty) set of models ÅÓ ´Ìµ in some specified class. For any class of theories Ì a semantics Ë Ñ then is a way to associate consequences ³ to some Ì ¾ Ì , based on ÅÓ ´Ìµ. Such a semantics is called well-behaved w.r.t. Ì , if Ë Ñ´Ì µ is defined and is not equal to Ä. 3 We often identify a semantics Ë Ñ with a consequence operation
Ä , where, in this paper, we stipulate that Ë Ñ´Ì µ Ä in case Ë Ñ´Ì µ is not defined. Generalizing the above, we say that a consequence operator is well-behaved w.r.t. Ì if ´Ìµ Ä. We focus on theories that have more than one semantics, i.e. a backup semantics with associated consequence operator and a intended semantics that corresponds to ÒØ . Slightly abusing terminology, if Ì is a set of theories, we say that a twin semantics (for Ì ) is a tuple Ë ´Ì ÒØ µ with the following property of supra-inferentiality: 
Ä.
A recovery operator is a computable function Ê Ì Ì . Given a twin semantics Ë for Ì , a recovery operator Ê on Ì and a distance function , we call the tuple Ê ´Ì ÒØ Êµ a recovery framework.
Properties of consequence operators
In this paper, we want to state some general results about the properties a suitable recovery operator should have. These properties partly depend on some abstract properties of the consequence operators and ÒØ . Therefore we recall (see e.g. [11] ) some general properties along which one can classify consequence operators:
A classical inference operation will also be denoted by Ò. An inference operation is called tarskian 4 if it satisfies inclusion, idempotency and monotony, it satisfies cumulativity if both cut and cautious monotony hold for . Finally, is called a cumulative inference operation, if it satisfies inclusion and cumulativity.
The following weaker forms of cut and cautious monotony are also useful: If
To see that cut implies weak cut, assume that ´ µ and ´ µ Ä. With cut we infer that ´ µ ´ µ and, since ´ µ Ä, we immediately have ´ µ Ä, so weak cut holds. The same holds for the relation between cautious monotony and weak monotony. We say that satisfies weak cumulativity if satisfies both weak cut and weak monotony. Furthermore is called weakly cumulative if it satisfies inclusion and weak cumulativity.
The role of the weak principles in nonmonotonic logics
Our main motivation to introduce the weak variants of cut and cautious monotony is that they help us in distinguishing two clusters of nonmonotonic entailment relations (cf [11] ): a weak cluster satisfying inclusion and weak cut and a strong cluster satisfying inclusion and weak cumulativity. Following some distinctions Makinson makes, we will call the former the grounded cluster and the latter the minimal model cluster. Furthermore, we make a distinction between a skeptical and a choice mode 5 of using a consequence operator. It is well-known that nonmonotonic logics as Default Logic (DL), Auto-Epistemic Logic (AEL) and the stable model semantics of logic programming (NMLP) do not satisfy cautious monotony neither in the skeptical, nor in the choice mode. With respect to cut, however, a distinction has to be made between these modes: while the skeptical modes of nonmonotonic consequence operations in general do satisfy cut, their choice modes do not (see [11] ). This means that these principles fail to distinguish these logics uniformly, i.e. independently from the mode in which they are used.
As we will show now, our weak principles are capable to identify these clusters in a uniform way. We show, using default logic as an example, that irrespective of the mode (skeptical or choice) in which the nonmonotonic inference operator is used, the entailment operators associated with logics in the grounded cluster all satisfy weak cut, but fail to satisfy weak monotony. By the correspondences between default logic and other nonmonotonic logics, this result also holds for auto-epistemic logic and the stable model semantics of logic programming. Conversely, all logics in the minimal model cluster trivially satisfy weak cumulativity, since it is implied by cumulativity.
Proposition 2.3
Let be an arbitrary set of default rules and let denote the inference operator using based on Reiter's default logic. Then does not satisfy weak monotony but does satisfy weak cut, irrespective from the mode (skeptical or choice) in which it is used.
PROOF We first show that in none of the inference modes weak monotony is satis- Next, we show that DL does satisfy weak cut in both modes. Since it satisfies cut in the skeptical mode it also satisfies weak cut in the skeptical mode. Therefore, we only have to show that it satisfies weak cut in the choice mode. ¿From [13] , we know that DL satisfies the confirmation of evidence principle, stating that for every default theory ¡ ´Ï µ, the theory ¡ ¼ ´Ï Ï ¼ µ has at least one extension , wheneveŕ Ï µ has a consistent extension and Ï ¼ . Now let be sets of sentences such that ´ µ and suppose that ´ µ Ä. Hence, there is some consistent extension of the default theory´ µ such that ´ µ . Since , we have , and hence, by the confirmation of evidence principle, there is at least one consistent extension for the theory´ ´ µ µ ´ µ.
Select such an extension . Since is consistent, ´ µ Ä and weak cut is satisfied. Hence, DL also satisfies weak cut in both the choice mode and the skeptical mode of inference.
With respect to AEL and NMLP, by the correspondence results as stated e.g. in [13] , we can easily show the same results to hold. We conclude that irrespective of the mode in which consequence operators based on mainstream nonmonotonic semantics are used, the systems falling in the stronger minimal model cluster all satisfy weak cumulativity, while the systems in the gounded model cluster all satisfy weak cut, but not weak monotony.
Some first results about recovery frameworks
Using the abstract principles mentioned before we can derive some properties that will turn out to be useful when dealing with recovery. The conclusion of this corollary is a weaker variant of the well-known stronger absorption principle ÒØ ÒØ ÒØ that holds when ÒØ is cumulative and ÒØ is supra-inferential with respect to an operator satisfying inclusion (cf. [11] ).
The postulates
In this section we introduce a minimal set of postulates every rational recovery operator has to satisfy. Given a recovery framework Ê ´Ì ÒØ Êµ we formulate the following postulates to characterize a recovery approach for ÒØ -theories, using a backup semantics . R1. Success : ÒØ´Ê´Ì µµ Ä whenever ´Ìµ Ä.
This means that the recovery should be successful: if in the back-up semantics, one can attach a meaning to Ì , this postulate requires Ê´Ì µ to be well-behaved with respect to the intended semantics.
R2. Conservativity : Ê´Ì µ Ì whenever ÒØ´Ì µ Ä. That is, whenever the backup semantics is meaningful, we should try to minimize the difference between Ì and Ê´Ì µ under .
The intention of these postulates is to characterize recovery operations that are both intuitively acceptable and successful: Definition 2. 7 We say that a recovery framework Ê ´Ì ÒØ Êµ is successful if, for every Ì ¾ Ì , Ê´Ì µ satisfies the postulates R1 to R3. If, moreover, it also holds that that ´Ì Ê´Ì µµ ¼, we say that Ê is strongly successful.
Successfulness does not exclude recovery frameworks that are successful in a trivial way, for example if ´Ìµ is not well-behaved for any Ì ¾ Ì or ÒØ´Ì µ is well-behaved for every Ì ¾ Ì . Therefore, we define a nontrivially successful recovery framework as follows: Definition 2.8 Let Ê ´Ì ÒØ Êµ be a successful recovery framework.
We say that Ê is non-trivially successful if there exists at least one Ì ¾ Ì such that ´Ìµ is well-behaved and ÒØ´Ì µ is not well-behaved.
¿From now on, we will assume that successful recovery frameworks are successful in a non-trivial way and we will just omit the adverb ''nontrivially".
Remark.
As we have seen before, the AGM approach satisfies these postulates, if for example we take Ò and the consequence operator that given a theory Ì returns the intersection of Ò´Ì ¼ µ for every maximal consistent subset Ì ¼ of Ì . A recovery operator Ê for a given theory Ì then returns the set Ê´Ì µ Ì Ì ¼ ¾Å×´Ìµ Ò´Ì µ, where Å×´Ì µ denotes the set of all maximal consistent subsets of Ì . Then Ê minimizes the distance between Ì and Ê´Ì µ under the backup semantics ´Ì Ê´Ì µµ ¼. We have, however, to pay a price: the consequence operator does not satisfy inclusion. As we will see, this is typically the case whenever the intended semantics satisfies weak cumulativity.
We first make the following observation about strongly successful frameworks, showing that the intended consequences of the recovered theory are bounded below by the backup consequences of the original theory. 
Recovery operators and consequence operators
The recovery postulates R1-R3 restrict the class of possible recovery operations to the ones that are considered to be intuitively acceptable. They do not, however, tell us under which conditions a recovery framework is strongly successful or not and, if it is strongly successful, which type of recovery operator will be acceptable. Therefore, in the subsequent sections we will study the interaction between the postulates R1-R3 and some abstract properties of inference operators in order to to find out 1. in which cases a recovery framework cannot be strongly successful; 2. which type of recovery operators can be excluded if the recovery framework is strongly successful; 3. in which cases the recovery framework is guaranteed to be strongly successful.
Recovery for weak cumulative semantics
In the previous section we remarked that the AGM framework for classical revision satisfies the postulates if we use a backup semantics that is not inclusive. We show now that whenever the intended semantics is weakly cumulative and Ê has to be strongly successful, the backup semantics cannot satisfy inclusion. (2) , it follows that ÒØ´Ì µ Ä, contradicting the assumption that ÒØ´Ì µ Ä. So Ê cannot be strongly successful; a contradiction. recovery postulates As an immediate consequence this result shows that if the intended semantics is (weakly) cumulative, recovery cannot be accomplished without changing the meaning of the transformed theory w.r.t. the backup semantics. This implies among others that whenever a paraconsistent logic is used as a backup semantics for a classical semantics, theory transformation results in a theory Ê´Ì µ not equivalent to Ì under the backup semantics.
More in general, we can easily show in successful recovery frameworks, Ê never can be an expansion, whenever ÒØ is weakly cumulative. This follows immediately from Ì Ê´Ì µ ÒØ´Ì µ Ä, which by weak monotony immediately implies that ÒØ´Ê´Ì µµ Ä.
So we conclude that whenever our intended semantics satisfies Weak Cumulativity it is almost inevitable that information is lost in theory recovery. This is the case with such systems as the Closed World Assumption (CWA), system C ( [9] ), variants of Circumscription and some reconstructions of Default Logic as Brewka's Cumulative Default Logic ( [2] ) 6 . It is easy to show that, for example Pereira's Contradiction Removal Semantics ( [15] ) using the classical consequence operator Ò as the backup semantics, satisfies the postulates R1-R3 and hence cannot be strongly successful if the intended semantics is cumulative.
Although there are some weakly cumulative nonmonotonic logics, as we remarked before, some nonmonotonic logics as default logic, auto-epistemic logic and nonmonotonic logic programming do not satisfy weak cumulativity, but satisfy weaker principles such as weak cut. So let us now consider the cases where the intended semantics is weaker and try to find out which types of recovery operators can or cannot be used that satisfy the postulates.
Failure for specific recovery operators
To exclude specific types of recovery operators in successful and strongly successful recovery frameworks, in this section we concentrate on two major types of recovery operators expansions and contractions. Given a recovery framework, we call a recov- 
Intermediate Conclusions
The results obtained above show that the distinction Makinson ([11] ) has made between two clusters of nonmonotonic entailment relations, one cluster satisfying inclusion and cut (the grounded cluster) and the other cluster satisfying cumulativity (the minimal model cluster), has some major consequences for the type of recovery operation to apply:
Expansions cannot be applied in the minimal model cluster characterized by preferential entailment and Poole's default logic;
Contractions are not useful in the grounded cluster containing DL, AEL and NMLP.
Let us consider Contradiction Removal framework of Pereira et al. (see [1] ) as a concrete example of a recovery framework. Using the language of logic programming, the main idea behind this approach is that logic programs that do not have acceptable models can be revised adequately by removing assumptions. These assumptions are literals of the form ÒÓØ Ð. Removal of such an assumption ÒÓØ Ð can be accomplished by adding a rule Ð to the program and taking the acceptable models of this expanded program as the intended models of the original program. It turns out that, taking a classical semantics as the back-up semantics, the Contradiction Removal Semantics is a special recovery framework in which the postulates R1-R3 are satisfied. This means that (i) it cannot be applied successfully if the intended semantics satisfies Weak Cumulativity and (ii) since the Contradiction Removal Semantics aims at adding a minimal set of revisions, the expansion approach can be justified by pointing out that contraction never can be an option, as we will show in the next section.
At second look, one observes that the results we have obtained are negative: they do not tell us which conditions have to be satisfied in order to guarantee that a revision framework would be successful.
Therefore, in the next sections, we will concentrate on successful recovery methods for mainstream nonmonotonic logics as DL, AEL and NMLP. We will show that, whenever the recovery framework can be applied successfully, but contraction is not possible, we can always rely on expansion as a successful recovery method.
Next, we will investigate which conditions have to be satisfied in order to apply an expansion successfully.
A Framework for Minimal Change
In this section we concentrate on useful recovery operators for weak nonmonotonic logics as DL, AEL and NMLP. We have shown that for these logics, retraction cannot be applied for strongly successful recovery. We will show that in fact we can concentrate on expansions.
First we show that expansions can be used to represent more general recovery operators whenever these are successfully applicable. That is, expansions can be used as indicators (whenever contractions are not applicable) to check whether or not there exist successful recovery operators. It turns out that we can construct such an expansion in a uniform way. Next we show, that whenever one wants to recover a theory Ì by changing it in a minimal way, one has to use expansions. So in case of minimal-change recovery, expansions are the only successful recovery operators.
Our first result shows that expansion frameworks are able to represent all successful recovery frameworks, whenever the backup semantics is cumulative and the intended semantics is a nonmonotonic one, satisfying weak cut. We show that the framework Ê ¼ ´Ì ÒØ Ê ¼ µ is a strongly successful recovery framework. So let Ì ¾ Ì and assume that ´Ìµ Ä. Theorem 3.4 shows that using a weak nonmonotonic logic and a cumulative backup semantics, expansions are able to characterize strongly successful recovery frameworks.
In some cases, however, we are able to prove a much stronger result. Let us define a recovery framework a minimal change recovery framework if the recovery operator Ê minimizes the difference between Ì and Ê´Ì µ: It is not difficult to see that the only recovery operators that can be used in a successful minimal change recovery framework are expansions if we use a cumulative backup semantics and an intended semantics satisfying weak cut: Theorem 3.6 Let Ê ´Ì ÒØ Êµ be a strongly successful minimal change recovery framework where is cumulative and ÒØ satisfies weak cut. Then Ê has to be an expansion. 
Recovery of Nonmonotonic Logic programs
The main goal of this section is to show that our recovery framework can be applied successfully to logic programming, especially to the stable model semantics of extend-ed logic programs. We assume the reader to be acquainted with the basic concepts and notations used in logic programming (cf. [7, 10] We use ÅÓ ´Èµ to denote the set of classical models of È ; Å ÒÅÓ ´Èµ denotes the set of minimal models and ËØ Ð ´Èµ the set of stable models of È . These sets are related by ËØ Ð ´Èµ Å ÒÅÓ ´Èµ ÅÓ ´Èµ.
Given such a semantics Ë Ñ ¾ ÅÓ Å ÒÅÓ ËØ Ð and a program È , we define the associated inference operation Ë Ñ as
It is not difficult to show that for every È and every such a semantics Sem, the inference operator Ë Ñ satisfies weak cut. We will now prove a general result for recovery of logic programs, showing that if the stable model semantics is used as the intended model semantics, we can use as our backup semantics every cumulative semantics Ë Ñ such that Ë Ñ´È µ and ËØ Ð ´Èµ Ë Ñ´È µ Å ÒÅÓ ´Èµ, i.e. every cumulative semantics weaker than the stable semantics and consisting of minimal models 7 . We will call such a semantics a potential back-up semantics (w.r.t. the stable semantics): We will need the following lemma pertaining to properties of stable models: 7 An example of such a semantics is the positivist semantics (see [5] Remark. Since we do not require the intended semantics to be two-valued, it is also possible to revise logic programs with explicit negation using the Well-Founded (WF) semantics (see [17] ) as the intended semantics and, for example, the standard three-valued Kleene semantics as the backup semantics. A program like: 
Conclusions
We have presented a framework and some postulates for theory recovery.
Our main results imply that there is a sharp distinction between recovery of theories satisfying (weak) monotony and theories that do not satisfy weak monotony but satisfy (weak) cut: while the former cannot be recovered using expansions, the latter cannot be recovered using expansions. Furthermore, we have shown that unless the backup semantics does not satisfy inclusion, recovery of cumulative theories cannot be achieved without some loss of information with respect to the backup semantics.
Both classical theory recovery frameworks like the AGM framework as well as existing frameworks for nonmonotonic theory recovery like the Contradiction Removal framework can be shown to satisfy the postulates we have proposed here.
With respect to weak nonmonotonic theories like default logic and others, we have shown that only mixed recovery operations -in which a part of the theory is retracted and at the same time other information is added to it-as well as (pure) expansion operators -in which a theory is recovered by adding information to it -are possibly successful recovery operators.
Our results show that, whenever Ê is a mixed recovery that satisfies the postulates R1-R3, it can always be replaced by a successful expansion that does not produce more changes. In particular, we have shown that whenever the backup semantics is cumulative, syntactically minimal recovery operators for weak nonmonotonic theories have to be expansions in order to be successful.
This result can be related to the approach to theory recovery of Inoue and Sakama (see [8] ), where they propose to revise a theory Ì by means of a minimal set of additions Á and removals Ç such that Ê´Ì µ Ì · Á Ç has an acceptable model. Their proposal thus comes down to advocating a mixed recovery approach. Our results show that, whenever Ê is a mixed recovery that satisfies the postulates R1-R3, it can always be replaced by a successful expansion that does not produce more changes. Finally, in a case study of recovery in nonmonotonic logic programming, we have shown that a stable model for a classical consistent program always can be approximated using a weaker cumulative (backup) semantics. The evidential semantics presented by Seipel ([16] ) can be seen as a special case of our framework, taking (partial) minimal model semantics as the backup semantics and (partial) stable model semantics as the intended semantics.
An obvious extension of the currently proposed framework would be to include a chain or partial order (weaker than) of backup semantics to use if the intended semantics fails. Then we can think of two ways to recover a theory: (i) select the strongest consistent backup semantics from the ordered set of backup semantics to construct a recovery framework or (ii) apply recovery iteratively, by selecting weaker and weaker backup semantics until a consistent one has been found and then use a sequence of recovered theories to recover the original theory.
